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"Alone in a leaking boat : The World Economic System In Retreat
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
- W. B. Yeats, 'The Second Coming'
The increasing social and political strains associated 
with high unemployment are creating pressures for a 
relaxation of the restrictive, anit-inflationary 
policies ... a very worrisome development ...
- IMF, Annual Report 1982
Adapt yourselves no longer to the pattern of this 
present world, but let your minds be remade and 
your whole nature thus transformed.
- 'Romans', 12:2
The Attainment of Zero Growth
The early 1970s saw the rise of intellectual and personal commitment to 
restraining economic growth. Partly this was based on prudent stewardship 
of limited resources; partly on a belief that much growth was the cause 
and consequence of the crassest form of self justifying materialism. In 
this form the quest for stable state economics was seen as compatible with 
concentrating resources on "basic human needs" and 'allowing' (the paternalism 
was there) poor nations to grow a bit so long as they did not make the 
mistake of seeking to emulate the living standards of the industrial North. 
There was of course a more overtly 'what we have we hold' strand which 
clearly sought to preserve the welfare of the rich and powerful nationally 
and internationally by cutting off both growth and redistribution but a 
proper concern for public relations led its rather blurring its bottom line 
(vide the Club of Rome and the Sierra Club). The emphasis was, for most 
stationary economic state partisans, on downgrading consumerist materialism, 
weakening the dominance of economic powers and principalities, increasing 
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By the end of the 1980s the world economic system had ’achieved' approximately 
zero growth overall (slightly more on an absolute, slightly less on a per 
human being basis) and use of some scarce resources (notably petroleum) had 
actually declined. 'Leisure' time was greatly increased with a decline 
in average hours 'worked' - biased in favour of the poor (eg youth, minorities 
unemployed). The South and the poor of the North had come to see very fully 
that they could not achieve industrial middle class standards of consumption 
and were more concerned than ever with basic needs - food, water, health, 
shelter, clothing, education (or rather with their increasing absence).
However, the hopes that zero growth was the route to justice, participation 
or sustainability (and even the meaner vision that it would be comfortable 
for the initially well placed) had turned into a nightmare. Economic 
inequality had increased - as a result of the action of economic forces and 
of deliberate state policy to reduce protection of their victims.. Social 
and political tensions had increased - in the South to levels threatening 
the stability of almost all states whatever their stance on equity and 
participation. Whether more sustainable on material resource projections or 
not, the international and national economic systems looked significantly 
less sustainable (and less worth sustaining) on political, social and human 
welfare criteria.
Whatever its virtues as a consequence of changed values (and they are consider­
able) a non-growth economy prior to such changes has proven (as its critics 
warned) inconsistent with justice, participation or human sustainability.
Zero growth as the result of failed growthmanship drifting into status quo def­
ending of low growth targets has a bias to the poor indeed - a bias to 
making them pay the cost.
Clearly the steady state economy advocates did not cause the 1969-1981 
movement to zero growth. Nor is their economic model the only one in evident 
disrepair today. Orthodox Keynesianism, the welfare state, monetarism, 
central and eastern European socialist planning, basic needs oriented programming, 
Brandt style common interest and New International Economic Order proposals 
for global structural change have fared no better. Whatever their future 
potential, whatever the apologia of their defenders, whatever the genuinely 
external causes, they are not in their present forms producing the goods or 
the jobs, the reduction of inequality or the growth of human welfare, the
practice of progress now or the vision of the future to be won each once 
seemed to offer.
"No worst there is none"?
The world economy (industrial capitalist, industrial socialist and Third 
World) is in the midst of its worst period since the 1930s. In retrospect 
the close of the 1960s marked the end of a quarter century of higher, more 
sustained, more stable, more broadly distributed (intra and internationally) 
growth of output and employment than had previously been recorded. Weak­
nesses and injustices there certainly were - especially in respect to poor 
countries and poor human beings - but 1930-45 and 1970-83 are in comparison 
substantially worse. The late 1960s US payments deficit, the 1972 grain 
price shock, the 1974 raw material price explosion (not just oil) were 
the hammer blows that broke an already shaky structure beyond repair. The 
brief recoveries of 1976-78 were interruptions in decline not changes in 
trend let alone structural changes to a new era of expansion.
The nature of the costs of a decade of economic unsuccess are clear. In 
the North the 1983 actual output will be about 25% lower than if 1960s 
trends had been sustainable and unemployment will be of the order of 10% 
versus 4 to 5%. That order of loss is not speedily reversible. Capacity is 
being destroyed - not simply idled. Productive capacity scrapping extends 
beyond mills (whether in textiles or steel or automobiles or shipbuilding 
or chemicals), to whole national industrial sectors, to urban and regional 
communities and to millions of people with no likelihood of ever again 
working in the craft or skill or industry they knew.
In the North at least, this is not - or not yet - a rerun of the 1930s. 
First, economic management has limited production falls (and therefore 
unemployment) somewhat. Second, inadequate as they may often be,safeguards 
in terms of income transfers (the welfare state if one prefers) have both 
kept demand up enough to prevent wholesale bankruptcies and limited the 
numbers of people subject to extreme physical deprivation (compared to the 
1930s even if not to the 1960s).
But there has been a parallel erosion - of belief, of vision, of self 
confidence, of humanity - which threatens even the current degree of damage 
limitation. This is symbolized by the steady growth of 'acceptable* (now 
often termed inevitable) levels of unemployment from 3% to 10% in the USA 
and several North European countries; the faith in privatisation as a
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retreat from failed economic management to market forces utilized by 
the private sector, the acceptance (or active promotion) of cuts in (or 
dismantling of) the welfare state as unsustainable precisely because so 
many more people need to call on its minimum resource transfer provisions.
The advocates of "there is no alternative" really do not offer a way 
forward but a way to bottom out and halt decline. But much of it is a way 
that would erode the economic management powers of states and the safety 
nets for many individuals which have, to date, limited the damage to 
national economic activity and human welfare from the decade old depression.
"Wider still and wider ..."
Over 1945-1970 the world economy became much more integrated - however 
unequally and inequitably. International trade and finance became much more 
central and all economies much more subject to shocks in any part of the 
system. But by 1981 international trade had achieved zero growth and 
declined absolutely in 1982 with 1983 prospects little, if any, better.
For most Third World countries the unit purchasing power of their exports 
had fallen over 40% between 1972 and 1981.
With low domestic market growth, high unemployment and stagnant world 
trade,protectionism (thought in the 1970s to be a dying anachronism in the 
North) has reemerged. While the formal structures of relatively free trade 
survive, the reality is increasingly different. Restrictions on the 
most vulnerable (the low income developing countries) have broadened to face 
the newly industrializing countries, the European periphery and now are 
on a course for setting off major USA-EEC-Japan trade wars.
For much of the 1970s Third World growth rates - of output and of imports 
though not of exports - held up fairly well. This lessened damage to their 
economies and people. It also limited decline in the North by providing 
a dynamic source of demand. That safety net (to the South, the North and 
the system) began to fray in 1979 and broke in 1982. It was based on Northern 
bank lending to Southern countries at unprecedented levels. It has 
foundered on the sustained recession with low export growth and high interest 
rates leading to near defaults (actually defaults redesignated as rescheduling) 
and a rising panic about overexposure. The international commercial bank 
system can no longer prop up Northern trade and Southern output expansion; 
it itself is a case for propping.
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Over 1980-83 the Southern economies output in real terms will have risen 
about 2% and their populations 8%. In the poorest the changes are more like 
minus 3% and 9%. In 1981 Latin America and Southern Europe showed 
negative output per capita growth for the first time since the 1930s. In 
1983 the President of the Asian Development Bank said that while the 
recession had been late in hitting the economies of his member states it 
was now nearly killing them.
In the South, there are no safety nets and little margin for economic 
management. Falls in output per human being and rises in the numbers 
without productive employment do not mean falling back on unemployment 
relief or the loss of amenities,but bring millions to the bare margin of 
survival and tens of millions to abject deprivation. Cuts in state spending 
(even if concentration is on preserving basic services which is by no 
means the most normal case) mean less and poorer provision of education, 
health and water at higher user fees, less food subsidies and employment 
promotion based on pushing down real wages and grower prices.
Here too there is a narrowing of vision - from a New International Economic 
Order to North-South talks, from basic human needs for all by 2000 to 
averting mass starvation and the reversal of falling death rates, from 
"catching up with the North" to preventing falls in real income per person.
In many cases these narrowed goals seem infinitely less attainable now 
than the broader ones did a decade, or even half a decade ago.
"Light at the end of the tunnel"?
Economists have a notorious tendency to overestimate how much the future 
will resemble the fairly recent past. Until the 1980s the most common 
implicit projection was return to the 1960s. Now it is for a continuation 
of 1979-82 with a bottoming out sometime.
That may be too optimistic. As noted four forces - Northern defensive economic
management and welfare (or ill fare limitation) states, Southern import 
and production growth and rapid banking system expansion of credit - which 
have limited the depth of the depression to date are weakening or totally 
spent. Decline - especially if there is a major shock - may perfectly
well accelerate out of control. The human cost of that should be evident.
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On the other hand, 1983 does seem likely to turn out better than initial 
projections. Real global output per human being may decline only 1%
(3% in the South) instead of over 2%. This may mark a bottoming out with 
recovery to 2 to 3% overall growth in the industrial economies (capitalist 
and socialist as a group); a rate at least slightly above that of population. 
What are the implications of that in human terms?
The answer may not quite be "naught for your comfort" but it is rather close. 
Such growth rates would lead to negligible employment growth (negative in 
the case of the UK according to a recent National Economic Development Council 
study). Therefore, they spell out a rising path for unemployment. As they 
would also do little to reduce government fiscal strain, they would not 
reverse the erosion of transfer payments to the growing numbers of unemployed 
and aged.
For the South the answer is even grimmer. Such growth would not restore 
world trade growth to levels adequate to halt their worsening terms of 
trade, allow rapid export volume expansion or restore their ability to 
borrow. Except for a fortunate few that type of "recovery" in the North 
spells continued declines in ability to import and continued negative to 
negligible growth in real output per person. For their poor it means 
extreme deprivation, more malnutrition and ill health, earlier death from 
specific diseases or cumulative malaise.
"A bias toward the poor ..."
At first glance it would appear that the depression seriously worsens the 
absolute and relative situation of the poor. Redistribution, historically, 
has been least difficult to secure out of growth; 'what we have we hold' 
has been the dominant philosophy during hard times.
However, there are, especially in respect to the Third World, not only 
neo-conservative but neo-liberal and neo-marxian arguments to the contrary.
The first is that the state is more authoritarian and inegalitarian than 
the market and less able to generate growth; therefore, the economically 
powerless will benefit most from unleashing it. The last is, in its 
extreme forms, the old argument that "worse is better". The existing states 
and systems are inegalitarian, unjust, dependent capitalist and shaky. 
Continued crisis will weaken them, raise proletarian consciousness and usher
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in the revolution. The neo-liberal position is that the neo-colonial 
system built up over 1945-70 was basically unsustainable and in any event 
benefitted only narrow elites in the South. To seek to preserve it would, 
objectively, hasten erosion of welfare states in the North and give just 
enough strength to Southern authoritarian regimes to survive without 
broadening their popular bases.
The problem with these arguments is not that their characterisation of 
Third World states as a group does not have substantial elements of 
truth in it, albeit it is reductionist in failing to recognise substantial 
diversity within and among states. It is that quite clearly the depression 
is not having any general result of leading to successful popular revolutions 
or broadening of the bases of previously authoritarian regimes. States 
seeking to defend previous basic needs oriented strategies - eg Tanzania - 
or in which such approaches are in dubious battle with neo-conservativeism - 
eg Zambia and Sri Lanka - are among the most affected and the least able 
to sustain either their strategic aims or their existing breadth of partic­
ipation and support.
Judging the tree by its fruit, the depression has a bias toward the poor -
toward making them pay for it. In the North the aged and unemployed bear
a disproportionate share of the burden; still employed wage earners are 
not radically worse off. In the South the limited gains in respect to 
nutrition, literacy, infant mortality and - in some cases - justice and 
participation are being eroded; often with a decade's hard won development 
wiped out in a year or two. Conceivably this is a way to create revolutions 
but: the present human cost is high; the success of the revolutions is 
most uncertain in the narrowest political terms and the gains in terms of 
justice and participation by no means assured by the political success of 
a revolution. Worse is rarely better for actual poor human beings and 
this depression does not appear to be an exception.
"What is to be done" - and why?
From a Christian perspective the answers to these questions are relatively 
easy at two different levels: that of principle and that of stop-gap 
amelioration of damage. Clearly the worsening of the position (political, 
self image, self determination as well as material) of poor people, poor 
communities and poor societies/countries must be halted and reversed. Equally
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clearly the worst immediate impact of the depression on particular human 
beings and groups of human beings must be reduced.
But those two guideposts do not carry one very far. Opposition to unleashing 
market forces on the weak combined with soup kitchens to ensure they do not 
starve is not nothing but it is not enough. The action - unless it leads 
to something more basic - becomes putting a poultice on a wound rapidly 
festering toward systemic blood poisoning. The opposition - unless 
converted into support for action with some credible chance of reversing 
the basic changes against the poor - is in constant danger of becoming
Pharasaic or even amounting to a washing of hands.
The Gospel is not a system for elaborating political economic strategy and
policy - as opposed to providing normative standards by which to judge
their goals and fruits. Unanimity on the least bad or most partially good 
political economically plausible approach is not likely. However, at present 
the problem is rather different - all of the political economic options 
look deeply flawed and doubtful of success; those stressing justice, 
participation and human sustainability at least as much as the others. The 
most sensitive and able political economists - whether politicians, civil 
servants, managers or intellectuals - are much surer of constraints than 
possibilities, weaknesses than strengths, what will not work than what will. 
While Christians as individuals have a duty to involve themselves in 
seeking to resolve that impasse, churches are not very plausible forums nor 
theology a very likely technical discipline for much of the dialogue and 
operational restructuring neéded.
However, Christian concern can go beyond opposition to impoverishment and 
soup kitchens:
a. a dialogue leading to action to end the depression is a priority
because without it justice, participation and sustainability cannot be 
approached more nearly;
b. guides for (constraints on) and criteria for judging some basic aspects
of proposals can be articulated from a commitment to the poor and to
self definition and self determination of human communities from 
household to national levels;
c. even if the structural changes needed are hard to identify those which
are ’’not needed" can usually be marked down and opposed in some detail;
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d. many interim proposals - defensive or partial but serviceable for 
the poor and going further than soup kitchens - are on offer and 
require selective examination and support not as roads to the New 
Jerusalem but as means to reduce burdens.
There is a need to recreate a vision of the struggle for human development
and to participate in shaping its values and a parallel need to struggle 
against courses of action clearly inimical to justice, participation and 
sustainability. At the same time there is a duty to judge what limited, 
interim steps would help limit the burdens of poverty and the retreat from
justice and participation which have built up so rapidly since 1978. To
damn these - eg the work of the Brandt Commission - as imperfect without 
considering whether they are on balance positive and what the actual 
alternatives are runs the risk of confusing human endeavour and divine 
justice (by which the former always falls short). It also - when practiced 
by churches and Christians who are not themselves exploited, oppressed and 
excluded - is in danger of willing martyrdom for others to avoid compromise 
by oneself.
What of UNCTAD Belgrade?
The implications of the present context in terms of attitudes and action 
by churches and Christian organisations and by Christians within other 
bodies are not easy to spell out simply and operationally. Most of the 
issues at UNCTAD have very real technical and practical aspects not soluble 
simply by recourse to ultimate normative goals. Many are tediously complex 
and confusing for the non-specialist. There can be no major systemic 
breakthroughs at Belgrade; whatever victories (for economic recovery globally 
or nationally or for economic justice inter and intra nationally) are 
attained will be in skirmishes, many of them defensive.
There is thus a real temptation to say that UNCTAD Belgrade is not really 
important from a Christian perspective and to pass on to debating political 
economic issues and values for Vancouver. Understandable as this would be, 
it would probably also be a mistake:
a. Belgrade does matter because if it fails totally to produce results,
UNCTAD - the least bad governmental forum for development dialogue - is 
likely to become moribund;
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b. halting the mean narrowing of vision and breaking out of dated 
formulations (including NIEO as now formulated which still proposes 
to restructure the dead system of the 1960s rather than structure 
the existing New International Economic Disorder) is a precondition 
for future strategic and structural action and UNCTAD is the least 
implausible 1983 forum to begin such a revival of serious dialogue;
c. a number of limited actions - on food security, on measures to support 
the "least developed", on landlocked developing countries, on poor 
country participation in commodity processing and international trading, 
on making compensatory (off-setting) finance to limit the impact of 
global trade shocks less inadequate and restrictive - may be attainable 
and would both limit damage and, less clearly, help rebuild belief in 
the possibility of agreed, effective forward progress.
This suggests that churches' and Christian action groups' roles might
include:
a. promoting reflection and dialogue among their members on issues like 
those raised in this paper both generally and in relation to UNCTAD 
Belgrade;
b. urge governments to approach dialogue on broad issues at Belgrade 
with freedom from pre-commitments to old tactical stances and a 
commitment to seeking ways to identify elements of a "Common Concern" 
in and commitment to reinaugurated development and to a revived world 
economy as an instrument to that end;
c. and call on them to approach specific practical measures - eg in respect 
to the least developed, the landlocked,compensatory finance, practical 
aspects of the commodity programme beyond the Common Fund proper - with 
a view to identifying what can be done and of making at least some 
positive commitments and resource allocations to demonstrate the 
continued value of common effort and the continued viability of dialogue 
and negotiation.
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Possible Appended Further Readings
A. The three volumes of "an ecumenical approach to economics" series
B. Brandt Commission - "Programme for Survival"
"Common Concern"
(I may have title of the 1983 volume wrong as I do not have it to hand.)
C. World Bank - World Development Report 1982;
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action
D. IMF - Annual Report 1982
E. UNCTAD - Trade and Development Report 1982
F. Society for International Development - Beyond Brandt: Menace and Hope (1980)
G. Institute for Development Studies (Sussex)
- Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: What 
Agendas for Action? (Bulletin, 14-1, 1983, C. Allison 
and R. H. Green, editors)
H. R. H. Green - "Things Fall Apart: the world economy in the 1980s", 
Third World Quarterly, Jan. 1983.
